Agent governance
Developer control plane for policies, metering, and activity history.
Workspace: Local workspaceRole: AdminWelcome Preview

Past approvals

9 returned1050All
RequestedDecidedAgentDecision IDRequestStatusReviewerReasonApproval IDNoteMetadata
Jul 20, 2026, 8:39:11.328 PM PDTJul 20, 2026, 8:39:15.320 PM PDTlanggraph-prospect-agent
agent_d884402f284d
dec_14e49b2e2381req_1d5558ca4b6dapprovedPreviewsend_outreach_emailapr_09517f3fb611None
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_63c8d6102098",
  "session_id": "sess_4f8edc32c078",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_236035d35309",
  "policy_version": "polv_eab79b663f84",
  "prompt_preview": "Request permission to execute action 'send_outreach_email' with context: {}",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 569,
  "requested_tools": [
    "send_outreach_email"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-5-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform remediation approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\n\nYou let customers use an AI co-pilot to generate Terraform remediations and then push fixes across accounts and regions, often for regulated workloads. That flow is great for speed, but an unreviewed Terraform apply can silently change IAM roles, flip S3 encryption, or open security groups and create an audit gap that breaks SOC2 or HIPAA evidence.\n\nThat is exactly where we see the most friction for teams like yours: customers want automated remediation, but their compliance and security owners want a tamperproof approval step and an auditable record that stays inside their environment. Gavrun addresses that by sitting inside the customer VPC and enforcing a tool-level approval gate on Terraform actions. When your co-pilot produces a plan, Gavrun evaluates the diff against policy, blocks high-risk applies unless a named approver signs off, and stores a cryptographically verifiable pre/post diff plus approver identity in the customer VPC for auditors.\n\nThe reason this matters for CloudXDN specifically is you sell both the automation and the compliance story. Adding an in-VPC approval gate means you can offer customers automated remediations while still proving who approved a change, why it matched policy, and that the enforcement never left their control. No external logs, no fuzzy blame during an audit.\n\nCurious if a VPC-hosted Terraform approval gate that ties directly into your co-pilot workflow would be useful for your enterprise customers?\n\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ],
  "edited_attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform remediation approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\r\n\r\nYou let customers use an AI co-pilot to generate Terraform remediations and then push fixes across accounts and regions, often for regulated workloads. That flow is great for speed, but an unreviewed Terraform apply can silently change IAM roles, flip S3 encryption, or open security groups and create an audit gap that breaks SOC2 or HIPAA evidence.\r\n\r\nThat is exactly where we see the most friction for teams like yours: customers want automated remediation, but their compliance and security owners want a tamperproof approval step and an auditable record that stays inside their environment. Gavrun addresses that by sitting inside the customer VPC and enforcing a tool-level approval gate on Terraform actions. When your co-pilot produces a plan, Gavrun evaluates the diff against policy, blocks high-risk applies unless a named approver signs off, and stores a cryptographically verifiable pre/post diff plus approver identity in the customer VPC for auditors.\r\n\r\nThe reason this matters for CloudXDN specifically is you sell both the automation and the compliance story. Adding an in-VPC approval gate means you can offer customers automated remediations while still proving who approved a change, why it matched policy, and that the enforcement never left their control. No external logs, no fuzzy blame during an audit.\r\n\r\nCurious if a VPC-hosted Terraform approval gate that ties directly into your co-pilot workflow would be useful for your enterprise customers?\r\n\r\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ]
}
Jul 20, 2026, 5:47:58.420 PM PDTJul 20, 2026, 5:48:06.512 PM PDTlanggraph-prospect-agent
agent_d884402f284d
dec_c8f0cf619803req_038cfc560d3bapprovedPreviewsend_outreach_emailapr_c91d6c38ac6dNone
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_927715533af6",
  "session_id": "sess_ad1c0741eb26",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_d8747082dddd",
  "policy_version": "polv_eab79b663f84",
  "prompt_preview": "Request permission to execute action 'send_outreach_email' with context: {}",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 583,
  "requested_tools": [
    "send_outreach_email"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-5-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform apply approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\n\nI noticed CloudXDN's GenAI co-pilot and managed service generate policy fixes and push automated remediations that end up as Terraform changes across customer AWS accounts. When those remediations run without a human in the loop, a single automated Terraform apply can widen an S3 ACL, change IAM roles, or remove encryption settings across multiple accounts and immediately create a compliance gap or data exposure.\n\nThat is why I wanted to flag a very specific control pattern rather than talk in generalities. Gavrun runs inside your VPC and attaches to the same Terraform CI job or deployment runner that your co-pilot uses. Before any terraform apply runs, Gavrun evaluates the planned diff for high-risk actions you care about, for example IAM policy edits, S3 public ACLs, or disabled logging. If a planned change matches policy, it pauses the apply and requires a named human approval. The approval, the plan diff, and the decision rationale are logged immutably inside your VPC so you have an audit trail for SOC 2 and ISO evidence without sending sensitive metadata to a third party.\n\nFor CloudXDN specifically, this stops an auto-remediation from turning into a regulatory incident while keeping your automation flow intact: low-risk fixes can still apply automatically, and any multi-account, high-blast-radius change gets the exact human checkpoint your customers and auditors expect.\n\nCurious if this pattern maps to how your co-pilot and remediation pipelines are wired? \n\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ],
  "edited_attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform apply approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\r\n\r\nI noticed CloudXDN's GenAI co-pilot and managed service generate policy fixes and push automated remediations that end up as Terraform changes across customer AWS accounts. When those remediations run without a human in the loop, a single automated Terraform apply can widen an S3 ACL, change IAM roles, or remove encryption settings across multiple accounts and immediately create a compliance gap or data exposure.\r\n\r\nThat is why I wanted to flag a very specific control pattern rather than talk in generalities. Gavrun runs inside your VPC and attaches to the same Terraform CI job or deployment runner that your co-pilot uses. Before any terraform apply runs, Gavrun evaluates the planned diff for high-risk actions you care about, for example IAM policy edits, S3 public ACLs, or disabled logging. If a planned change matches policy, it pauses the apply and requires a named human approval. The approval, the plan diff, and the decision rationale are logged immutably inside your VPC so you have an audit trail for SOC 2 and ISO evidence without sending sensitive metadata to a third party.\r\n\r\nFor CloudXDN specifically, this stops an auto-remediation from turning into a regulatory incident while keeping your automation flow intact: low-risk fixes can still apply automatically, and any multi-account, high-blast-radius change gets the exact human checkpoint your customers and auditors expect.\r\n\r\nCurious if this pattern maps to how your co-pilot and remediation pipelines are wired? \r\n\r\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ]
}
Jul 20, 2026, 5:41:05.764 PM PDTJul 20, 2026, 5:41:31.879 PM PDTlanggraph-prospect-agent
agent_d884402f284d
dec_202fdd320a54req_3b56290061e5approvedPreviewsend_outreach_emailapr_f04db9597762None
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_dad474931809",
  "session_id": "sess_ed07a272844b",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_2ebb48544a90",
  "policy_version": "polv_eab79b663f84",
  "prompt_preview": "Request permission to execute action 'send_outreach_email' with context: {}",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 591,
  "requested_tools": [
    "send_outreach_email"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-5-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Automated Terraform remediation",
      "body": "Sandy,\n\nYou run GenAI policy generation and automated remediations that can push Terraform changes across customer accounts, which means your bots sometimes go from \"flag\" to \"fix\" without human review. That is exactly where regulated customers classrooms like yours see the most risk: a single auto-applied change can open a public S3 bucket, widen an IAM role, or alter security groups across accounts and then show up in an audit as \"remediated\" with no reviewer on record.\n\nThat is why I wanted to mention a practical guard we see working for teams like yours. Gavrun sits inside the same VPC where Terraform runs and enforces policy at the tool level, so your remediation agent can be allowed to propose a plan but blocked from applying certain resource changes until a named approver signs off. The enforcement stays in your environment so the approval workflow and the recorded plan-and-apply logs never leave your infrastructure, which makes it straightforward to produce the traceability auditors ask for when a remediation touched a regulated asset.\n\nFor Cloud XDN specifically this maps to: allow your GenAI to auto-fix low-risk lint and tagging issues, but require an explicit human-approval for IAM, networking, or public-bucket changes; every plan, approver, and apply is immutably logged inside your VPC for SOC2 and ISO evidence. No rewrites of your remediation logic needed, just a gate where you want it.\n\nCurious if this alignment is worth a look? \n\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ],
  "edited_attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Automated Terraform remediation",
      "body": "Sandy,\r\n\r\nYou run GenAI policy generation and automated remediations that can push Terraform changes across customer accounts, which means your bots sometimes go from \"flag\" to \"fix\" without human review. That is exactly where regulated customers classrooms like yours see the most risk: a single auto-applied change can open a public S3 bucket, widen an IAM role, or alter security groups across accounts and then show up in an audit as \"remediated\" with no reviewer on record.\r\n\r\nThat is why I wanted to mention a practical guard we see working for teams like yours. Gavrun sits inside the same VPC where Terraform runs and enforces policy at the tool level, so your remediation agent can be allowed to propose a plan but blocked from applying certain resource changes until a named approver signs off. The enforcement stays in your environment so the approval workflow and the recorded plan-and-apply logs never leave your infrastructure, which makes it straightforward to produce the traceability auditors ask for when a remediation touched a regulated asset.\r\n\r\nFor Cloud XDN specifically this maps to: allow your GenAI to auto-fix low-risk lint and tagging issues, but require an explicit human-approval for IAM, networking, or public-bucket changes; every plan, approver, and apply is immutably logged inside your VPC for SOC2 and ISO evidence. No rewrites of your remediation logic needed, just a gate where you want it.\r\n\r\nCurious if this alignment is worth a look? \r\n\r\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ]
}
Jul 20, 2026, 5:39:00.537 PM PDTJul 20, 2026, 5:41:33.052 PM PDTlanggraph-prospect-agent
agent_d884402f284d
dec_0754a3fcb8a8req_cadef690c9e4approvedPreviewsend_outreach_emailapr_81d62fc3dc5dNone
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_32b6fb62aee3",
  "session_id": "sess_0e9fbe17a97f",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_15096211129f",
  "policy_version": "polv_eab79b663f84",
  "prompt_preview": "Request permission to execute action 'send_outreach_email' with context: {}",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 530,
  "requested_tools": [
    "send_outreach_email"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-5-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform remediation apply",
      "body": "Sandy,\n\nI noticed your GenAI co-pilot can generate Terraform remediations and push fixes automatically to catch non compliant deployments before they go live. That flow is exactly where customers who need SOC2 and ISO evidence get nervous: an automated terraform apply that changes IAM roles, flips S3 buckets to public, or alters network rules can remediate a policy violation and at the same time create a new compliance gap if it is not reviewed.\n\nThat is why I wanted to mention a governance pattern that maps directly to that mechanism. Gavrun enforces tool-level policies on the agent that does the terraform apply, so you can require a human approval for any apply that touches IAM, public buckets, or cross-account changes, deny classes of risky changes outright, and keep the full approval and command audit inside your VPC for audit trails. In practice that means your co-pilot can still suggest and run fixes, but any apply that would, for example, widen an S3 ACL or attach an overly permissive role gets held for a named reviewer and the signed approval is logged where your compliance team expects to find it.\n\nIf you care about maintaining the speed of automated remediations while keeping evidentiary control for regulated customers, worth a look? \n\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ],
  "edited_attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform remediation apply",
      "body": "Sandy,\r\n\r\nI noticed your GenAI co-pilot can generate Terraform remediations and push fixes automatically to catch non compliant deployments before they go live. That flow is exactly where customers who need SOC2 and ISO evidence get nervous: an automated terraform apply that changes IAM roles, flips S3 buckets to public, or alters network rules can remediate a policy violation and at the same time create a new compliance gap if it is not reviewed.\r\n\r\nThat is why I wanted to mention a governance pattern that maps directly to that mechanism. Gavrun enforces tool-level policies on the agent that does the terraform apply, so you can require a human approval for any apply that touches IAM, public buckets, or cross-account changes, deny classes of risky changes outright, and keep the full approval and command audit inside your VPC for audit trails. In practice that means your co-pilot can still suggest and run fixes, but any apply that would, for example, widen an S3 ACL or attach an overly permissive role gets held for a named reviewer and the signed approval is logged where your compliance team expects to find it.\r\n\r\nIf you care about maintaining the speed of automated remediations while keeping evidentiary control for regulated customers, worth a look? \r\n\r\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ]
}
Jul 20, 2026, 5:35:45.396 PM PDTJul 20, 2026, 5:35:51.634 PM PDTlanggraph-prospect-agent
agent_d884402f284d
dec_9e5fb5b02650req_4b9ce2e6ed2aapprovedPreviewsend_outreach_emailapr_a532853f35e1None
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_66d350e56595",
  "session_id": "sess_4dba01a7f2e8",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_8baa43b1712a",
  "policy_version": "polv_eab79b663f84",
  "prompt_preview": "Request permission to execute action 'send_outreach_email' with context: {}",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 588,
  "requested_tools": [
    "send_outreach_email"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-5-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\n\nYou let customers run your GenAI co-pilot to generate policy fixes and AI-recommended remediations that translate into Terraform changes across multiple AWS accounts. That workflow is exactly where an unreviewed recommendation can turn into a high blast radius action, for example an automated Terraform apply that creates a new IAM role with broad permissions, opens a security group to 0.0.0.0/0, or flips an S3 bucket to public.\n\nThat is why we built a policy-first, in-VPC enforcement layer that answers that exact gap. Instead of trying to catch a bad change after it lands, Gavrun intercepts Terraform plan/apply requests and applies rules you define that allow, deny, or require human approval for specific changes such as IAM modifications, public networking changes, or S3 ACL updates. The enforcement and the audit trail never leave your customers environment because logs and enforcement run inside their VPC, so evidence for SOC2, ISO, PCI, or HIPAA audits stays under their control.\n\nWe focus on a single practical control that maps to what you sell: a Terraform approval gate that automatically blocks any apply which would widen trust boundaries unless a named human reviewer signs off, and records who approved what, when, and why. That makes it possible for you to keep offering automated remediations and multi-account deploys while giving regulated customers a verifiable human-approval step.\n\nCurious if this specific Terraform approval gate would be useful for your Enterprise tier? \n\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ],
  "edited_attachments": [
    {
      "type": "email_draft",
      "subject": "Gavrun for Cloud XDN - Terraform approval gate",
      "body": "Sandy,\r\n\r\nYou let customers run your GenAI co-pilot to generate policy fixes and AI-recommended remediations that translate into Terraform changes across multiple AWS accounts. That workflow is exactly where an unreviewed recommendation can turn into a high blast radius action, for example an automated Terraform apply that creates a new IAM role with broad permissions, opens a security group to 0.0.0.0/0, or flips an S3 bucket to public.\r\n\r\nThat is why we built a policy-first, in-VPC enforcement layer that answers that exact gap. Instead of trying to catch a bad change after it lands, Gavrun intercepts Terraform plan/apply requests and applies rules you define that allow, deny, or require human approval for specific changes such as IAM modifications, public networking changes, or S3 ACL updates. The enforcement and the audit trail never leave your customers environment because logs and enforcement run inside their VPC, so evidence for SOC2, ISO, PCI, or HIPAA audits stays under their control.\r\n\r\nWe focus on a single practical control that maps to what you sell: a Terraform approval gate that automatically blocks any apply which would widen trust boundaries unless a named human reviewer signs off, and records who approved what, when, and why. That makes it possible for you to keep offering automated remediations and multi-account deploys while giving regulated customers a verifiable human-approval step.\r\n\r\nCurious if this specific Terraform approval gate would be useful for your Enterprise tier? \r\n\r\n- The Gavrun Team"
    }
  ]
}
Jul 17, 2026, 11:01:18.094 AM PDTJul 17, 2026, 11:01:47.762 AM PDTresearch_crew
agent_3b16e78e7b5e
dec_3f20f0b6f271req_e2e5058727cdapprovedPreviewdelete_research_dataapr_8bfe4344f6e2None
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_6c955aad8749",
  "session_id": "sess_research_crew",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_9e2acc95c3fb",
  "policy_version": "polv_728a942040db",
  "prompt_preview": "Archive and delete research data collected for 'large language models 2025' after synthesis.",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 208,
  "requested_tools": [
    "delete_research_data"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-4o-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": []
}
Jul 17, 2026, 10:49:13.636 AM PDTJul 17, 2026, 10:49:54.756 AM PDTresearch_crew
agent_3b16e78e7b5e
dec_571f77a207cbreq_185506fc3314approvedPreviewdelete_research_dataapr_b2a36c335fbaNone
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_a285fa1be0b9",
  "session_id": "sess_research_crew",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_407f0a53cf21",
  "policy_version": "polv_728a942040db",
  "prompt_preview": "Archive and delete research data collected for 'large language models 2025' after synthesis.",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 208,
  "requested_tools": [
    "delete_research_data"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-4o-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": []
}
Jul 17, 2026, 10:19:18.070 AM PDTJul 17, 2026, 10:19:24.795 AM PDTresearch_crew
agent_3b16e78e7b5e
dec_a4c1b7254fcdreq_51d728242985approvedPreviewdelete_research_dataapr_09651e3abbe2None
{
  "audit_ref": "aud_8c7a9845afc3",
  "session_id": "sess_research_crew",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_cce55d753bbe",
  "policy_version": "polv_3c3c8b14f57c",
  "prompt_preview": "Archive and delete research data collected for 'large language models 2025' after synthesis.",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 208,
  "requested_tools": [
    "delete_research_data"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-4o-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": []
}
Jul 17, 2026, 10:13:42.835 AM PDTJul 17, 2026, 10:13:53.500 AM PDTresearch_crew
agent_3b16e78e7b5e
dec_86e47a12711dreq_c4676a05bc6aapprovedPreviewdelete_research_dataapr_f719f7c13791None
{
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  "session_id": "sess_research_crew",
  "preflight_request_id": "pref_a443ef346c05",
  "policy_version": "polv_3c3c8b14f57c",
  "prompt_preview": "Archive and delete research data collected for 'large language models 2025' after synthesis.",
  "estimated_input_tokens": 208,
  "requested_tools": [
    "delete_research_data"
  ],
  "requested_models": [
    "gpt-4o-mini"
  ],
  "attachments": []
}